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Book Reviews 
Edmund Burke's Aesthetic Ideology: Language, Gender and Political Economy in 
Revolution by Tom Furniss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Pp. xiv + 306. $59.95. 
Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction of Art edited by Paul Mat-
tick, Jr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. vii + 256. $49.95. 
At one point in the introductory essay in which Paul Mattick, Jr. describes 
the essays in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction of Art, he 
identifies the central view that unites the several contributors to the volume. 
"The authors," he writes, "work with a variety of analytic and historical 
methods ... but all rest on the conviction that aesthetic ideas, of the present 
as well as the past, can be fully understood when seen not only in relation to 
intellectual and other social contexts but as themselves constructed in histo-
ry" (3). This is a promising enough beginning, particularly insofar as it opens 
on a number of views that have corne to dominate discussions of aesthetics 
in the last quarter century. For Mattick's affirmation of the importance of 
history echoes the influential view that aesthetics and history have been, un-
til recently, treated as if they were opposed to one another. Whether aesthet-
ics has been seen as an effort to talk about the "timeless" (what is ahlstorical 
by virtue of persisting throughout history) or whether it has been seen as an 
effort to deny the Significance of one's material circumstances, it has, almost 
invariably, been described as in some kind of opposition to history. 
Mattick operates under the assumption that the opposition~or, more pre-
cisely, the antagonism~between aesthetics and history represents an histori-
cal deficiency in aesthetics (as in philosophy generally), and his introduction 
presents various strategies for dosing aesthetics accordingly. The first of 
these is the injunction to consider that history itself has changed: "only dur-
ing the last several hundred years" has "the idea gained ground that history 
is marked by discontinuities as well as continuities" (1). For Mattick, this 
seems to mean that the appearance of the idea of discontinuity is, in the first 
place, itself an historical phenomenon and, in the second, a repudiation of 
the notion that there are fixed sets of arguments and alternatives~" a cycling 
through a set of constant alternatives" (1). Yet after having introduced these 
plausible views, he proceeds to unpack them in less plausible ways. For in-
stance, repudiating cycles is for him tantamount to discarding the project of 
constructing intellectual equivalences (between the savage and the civilized, 
as in Levi-Strauss's work; between the classical and the modern, as in Ber-
nard Williams's Shame and Necessity, in which Williams renewed the claim of 
structuralist anthropology to discovery justifiable and recognizable ethical 
views rather than the mere otherness of superstition in earlier cultures). 
The historicity of the idea of discontinuity is easy enough for Mattick to 
establish; it came into being with the "social transformation" effected by "the 
development of the capitalist mode of production" (1). What is somewhat 
more difficult to see is why the fact that history can come to be perceived as 
involving discontinuity~that is, change~should come to mean that the no-
tion of history ought to be seen to be identical only with the notion of dis-
continuity. Yet it turns out that the emergence of the idea of discontinuity in 
history both makes the idea of a world-historical survey of aesthetics absurd, 
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in Mattick's view, and raises a question about whether he would take it to 
be possible actually to write a history. 
From the standpoint of his insistence upon historical discontinuity, he can 
point to a fine irony in the surveys that we have taken to be histories of aes-
thetics: that modern aestheticians discover "the beginning of their discipline 
in the mid-1700s" but that they "almost invariably" accompany that recogni-
tion with "the identification of an earlier origin in classical Greece" (3). For 
Mattick such a move involves a conspicuous lack of self-consciousness, an 
inability, in the moment one is announcing the sempiternal continuity of aes-
thetics, to keep track of the fact that one had, only a moment before, an-
nounced its emergence. He instances, in support of his view that one should 
not press transhistorical resemblances too hard, Marx's objection to conflat-
ing similarity of materials and means of labor with similarity of conceptions. 
Marx, ridiculing political economists who imagine that "the Kirghiz who 
cuts down rushes with a knife he has stolen from a Russian so as to weave 
them together to make a canoe is just as true a capitalist as Herr von Roths-
child," had crowed that he "could prove with equal facility that the Greeks 
and Romans celebrated communion because they drank wine and ate breadf 
and that the Turks sprinkle themselves daily with holy water like Catholics 
because they wash themselves daily" (8). Yet while Marx seems primarily to 
be attacking vulgar materialism (in the form of the view that apparently sim-
ilar materials and means of labor must involve similar intentions)f Mattick 
seems to press the position rather harder, as if to suggest that it would be 
wrong for a native speaker of any languagef for instance, to reclassify his 
earlier speech as a series of instances of prose. 
His critique of the "eighteenth-century reclassification of the activities and 
objects that now form the fine arts" thus amounts to a rejection of the notion 
that there are certain basic questions about fictitious representation that now 
look like a kind of pre-history of aesthetics as we have come to know it since 
the eighteenth century. The double move of saying that people came to dis-
cuss aesthetics in the eighteenth century and that Plato, for instance, had 
posed substantial questions about the relationship between fictions and rea-
son must come, for him, to look like a basic mistake. It seems to emphasize 
the truth of issues at the expense of the particular means that get at and con-
stitute that truth (as if there were an aesthetic "character previously ob-
scured" [6]); and properly historical consciousness, he argues, ought to be 
the repudiation of all such efforts at equivalence. 
Yet if he first suggested that it was simply mistaken to act as if Plato were 
really talking about the same things as Addison, he begins to waffle on this 
issue. If twentieth-century commentators make this mistake, they aref as he 
recognizes very clearly, at least authorized by example. The history of aes-
thetics itself-not merely for modern aestheticians talking about the history 
of their field but also for the eighteenth-century writers on art and beauty 
whom we are historicizing-continual1y belies a basic commihnent to the 
Similarity or continuity of their discussion to that of the ancients. As Mattick 
appreciates, they saw themselves as "continuing a form of discourse prac-
ticed by the ancients, as evidenced in their constant reference to the writings 
of Plato, Aristotle, Horce, Cicero, Quintilian, Pliny, and the supposed Longi-
nus" (6). And it is this belief that obviously complicates what had, a moment 
T 
c' 
Criticism, Vol. XXXVII,No. 1: Book Reviews 159 
ago, seemed to be the patent absurdity of making things mean in the present 
by alienating them from their historical circumstances. 
There is, of course, the larger question of whether and why we should 
want history at all if it never seemed recognizable as anything that might re-
semble part of our own experience. But leaving that question aside, there is 
the rather Simpler matter of explicating the passage from Marx that Mattick 
instances. While Mattick presents Marx as saying that cross-cultural and 
transhistorical generalizations are absurd, it would appear that Marx's claim 
is rather less sweeping. If Turks don't become Catholics by washing them-
selves, his point is surely that physical resemblance betvveen two actions is 
less important than the kinds of intention one could bring to it. No Turk at 
his toilet is, on Marx's account, likely to be, say, a leading candidate to be-
come pope, because neither he nor anyone else would see his washing him-
self as involving the capacity for any of the other actions that would make 
him a contender for that office. But, unless the brevity of an introduction 
misrepresents his position entirely, Mattick inclines towards disrupting not 
only the resemblance between bathing Turks and self-anOinting Catholics 
but also the resemblance between early and late Catholics, who, though sep-
arated from one another by a great deal, are presumably sometimes united 
in their ways of deploying water. 
The difficulty is not in Mattick's primary aim, which is the admirable one 
of eschewing presentist and progressivist accounts of history, but rather in 
his sense of how-and how thoroughly-one must react against the tempta-
tions against presentism and progreSSivism. On the one hand, it is very easy 
to imagine that, if the notion of a publicity effect means anything, it crucially 
applies to the relationship between the present and the past, and to the fact 
that what feels like present actuality renews its recommendations much 
more readily than any represented past can do. Yet because Mattick is so 
alert to the mistakermess of privileging our own ways of constructing things 
now, he imagines that he needs to find a way of equalizing the competition 
between the past and the present and must therefore level the playing field 
by emphasizing discourse (as opposed to "a focus on self-conscious theory") 
(12). Rejecting Foucault's account of "discursive formations" because 
"neither he nor anyone else has actually tried to define the set of rules re-
quired to specify such a formation for any cognitive domain" (11), Mattick 
puts forward in preference J. G. A. Pocock's account, which represents dis-
course less as self-conscious theory than as '''the great variety of things that 
could be said or seen to have been said, and upon the diversity of linguistic 
contexts that went to determine what could be said but were at the same 
time acted upon by what was said'" (12). Except for its restriction to the 
written word, Pocock's account of discourse may sound suspiciously akin to 
Foucault's, in that both are committed to suggesting the way in which repre-
sentations are not simply assertions of meaning but recommendations as 
well (and in that both have been taken as suggesting that there is a Simple 
determinism at work in the linguistic and social forms of an age). And it is 
that aspect of the notion of discourse-its attention to the fact that every 
statement or theme or question also lays itself down as a partial context for 
subsequent statements, themes, and questions-that we can see Foucault 
getting at when he is concerned with the significance of architecture and a 
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variety of word-based and non-ward-based technologies that influence be-
havior, or that we can see Pocock reaching for when he is concerned with 
how '''each language context betokens a political, social, or historical context 
within which it is itself situated ... [and how] each language to some degree 
selects and prescribes the context within which it is to be recognized'" (12). 
For Mattick, discourse seems particularly important for suggesting an his-
torical record that is describable not simply as the record of individual views 
("a focus on self-conscious theory" [12]) nor as an expression of what Hazlitt 
called the spirit of the age. That is, discourse, on the aCcolUlt implicit here, 
seems to revolve around the ways in which "a variety of contexts" may in-
fluence one another, or, as Mattick puts it, are "capable both of cooperating 
and of interfering with each other in various ways" (12). The question of 
how one recognizes a context (a question that had appeared to have a certain 
urgency in relation to Foucault) thus does not so much get answered as re-
solved into a linguistic materialism that is a sophisticated variant on the 
crude materialism that Marx had lampooned in portraying the absurdity of 
taking a washing Turk for a self-anointing Christian. And if Mattick had 
seemed to view a text as importantly bound up with context, he drops that 
issue to discuss deviations from this inchoate notion; he moves on to de-
scribe both "textual migrations" (13), movements in which texts leave the lo-
cal contexts in which they arose and transport themselves to others (the kind 
of thing that once occupied influence studies and publication histories), and 
what we might call "contextual migrations/' movements in which "pictur-
esque travel accounts," for example, "are linked with Sir Joshua Reynolds's 
Academy lectures, Locke's theory of property, and Smith's moral theory" (as 
in Elizabeth Bohls' essay in the volume [12]). 
If the particularity of context once seemed like the justification for an his-
toricism that would be the antidote to presentism, that is, textual migration 
and contextual migration seem instead to argue the case for a principled al-
ienation. In other words, the notion of context ceases to involve the project of 
nZirrowing the field of interpretative probabilities to what someone like 
Marx's Turk probably does and does not mean with his washing; it is in-
stcad an expansive notion in which the association between one context and 
<mother may clearly exceed what any individual speaker was capable of 
meaning by it. 
The discursive solution thus seems like a peculiar antidote to the hazards 
of presentism, in as much as it would appear to perform the same job of al-
ienation that presentism does; and in fact the introduction proceeds to return 
to a version of the presentism that it had eschevved. For the present, it 
emerges, has derived from history all along: "we stand as present-day com-
mentators on the post within a discourse formed in art by elcments of that 
past, and to which we must therefore take a reflexive and critical stance" 
(15). fvlorcO\'cr, hc claims, "the discourse studied here is one in which the 
writcrs of these essays arc implicatcd" (15). The "rcflexive and critical 
stJnce" therefore comes to lie in the recognition that there is no "reflexive 
,md critic.JI stancc" a\'<1i1ablc, since present discourses depend upon pilst dis-
cnursl's-indccd, Me incre.Jsingly indistinguishilble from past discourses. 
Thl' introduction comes around, in other words, to rejecting the view that 
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the past is continuous with the present by affirming that the present is con-
tinuous with the past. 
Reassuring as it may be to hear that there is "no conflict in principle be-
tween historical accuracy and relevance to current social and so intellectual 
concerns" (16), there is something puzzling as well in this formulation. For if 
the project of the volume seemed initially to involve showing how "art as 
we know it-the system of 'fine arts' -is largely peculiar to modern society," 
that project seemed to suggest that real historical accuracy would eliminate 
such relevance; if writers in the historical past didn't mean the same thing 
we mean by similar activities, how can an historical account that exposes 
that difference in meaning imagine that those different meanings are rele-
vant to our views? The problem of relevance has, I suspect, surfaced in large 
measure because the history that was supposed to rescue us from aestheti-
cism has come to sound increasingly similar to it. The quandary is this: 
Bourdieu's accotmt of aesthetics as "an ethos of elective distance from the 
necessities of the natural and social world" informs several of the essays in-
cluded here; that account carries with it a critique of high formalism and 
aesthetics that sees them as enacting and endorsing the notion of elective 
distance, the proposition that natural and social conditions fall with varying 
degrees of force on various different people and that modern aesthetic expe-
rience is one way of continuing that differential impact; and yet the historical 
account that recognized the full extent of the difference between earlier ac-
counts and our own would itself clearly enact elective distance just as forci-
bly. The difference between distance by way of imagination and distance by 
way of history does not, that is, seem particularly compelling. 
I have dwelt this long upon Mattick's brief introduction, first, because the 
timeliness of the volume revolves around the sense of urgency that has re-
cently attached to historicizing work and, second, because I think that we 
need better reasons for that urgency than the appeal to the reality of the dis-
course (13) and to the relevance of historical accuracy. Indeed, the volume it-
self presents essays with a variety of kinds of implicit argument for the rele-
vance of history. Jeffrey Barnouw's "The beginnings of 'aesthetics' and the 
Leibnizian conception of sensation" offers an account of Leibniz's discussion 
of subliminal or marginal awareness as a "confused" mode of representation 
and suggests the work it did as a context for the writing of Baumgarten and 
other participants in eighteenth-century aesthetic discussions; the clear im-
plication of his practice is that an historical account helps us to understand 
the writings of early aestheticians better than we could by simply reading off 
the words on the page. And while Barnouw confines his discussions to the 
question of how Leibniz and his arguments might have served as a recom-
mendation to other writers, other contributors-notably Bohls, Shusterman, 
Mattick, and Woodmansee--emphasize the uses of art to express social and 
economic motives and see historical research as partially aimed at counter-
ing the recommendations that are plausibly involved in any description of 
action. If Woodmansee, for example, would emphasize that Addison was 
addressing bankers looking to fill their new-found leisure, a principal stress 
in her discussion falls on the notion that we should not do as they do, should 
not take their actions and the objects and texts that represent them as prece-
dents for our own. 
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Torn Furniss's Edmund Burke's Aesthetic Ideology: Language, Gender and Polit-
ical Economy in Revolution, like Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Recon-
struction of Art, examines the interconnections between aesthetics and histo-
ry, or aesthetics and politics. Furniss offers a detailed account of Burke 
through readings of A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful (1757) and Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) 
that reach well beyond those texts to a variety of writings by Burke's con-
temporaries. He is, in particular, preoccupied with a problem that has long 
troubled commentators on Burke-that the political positions that Burke 
sketches in his primarily aesthetic writing seem to contradict those of his 
later political writing. This contradiction has produced a variety of explana-
tions, including Isaac Krarnnick's account of Burke's conflicted "bourgeois 
identity" and C. B. Macpherson's argument that there was no real contradic-
tion because the traditional order was already capitalist. Furniss's own inter-
est, however, is to "move away from such author-centred models of reading 
and textual production in order to see Burke's texts as a weave of discourses 
which intersect with a range of interrelated writings in the eighteenth centu-
ry" (7). 
Furniss treats a number of subjects that have figured prominently in Burke 
scholarship in recent years-Burke's account of the sublime, his view of lan-
guage, the account of gender that emerges from his work, and his views of 
the place of custom and revolution, and he does so with assurance and intel-
ligence. Indeed, his book stands as eloquent testimony to the usefulness that 
deconstructive criticism can have for an intelligent critic and to the aptness 
of the fit between some deconstructive concerns and Burke's own commit-
ments. Although Burke's Aesthetic Ideology is shaped in part by exclusions 
that many historians will doubtless regret, Furniss's intense readings of the 
Enquiry and the Reflections attempt to emphasize the concerns that bind these 
texts to one another. (However much is added by the discussions of Richard 
Price, Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft and others, the focus on these two 
key Burke texts is crucial to the organization of the book.) A standard histor-
ical overview might well talk about Burke's personal views at the various 
stages of his life, might simply discuss the changes in his views over the 
more than thirty years that separates the two works, or might even suggest 
that, being about two very different subjects, tl,e two were largely uruelated. 
Furniss, however, is interested (in a perfectly reasonable version of decon-
structive practice) in stressing the two texts' relationship to one another, be-
cause that gives him a way of talking about how the two texts constitute be-
tween them something like a sustained irony, in which the same words now 
seem to be used for very different effect from that of their first occurrence. In 
its less compelling version, this amounts to noting a resemblance between 
terms that have had drastically different valences attached to them: thus, he 
argues that "the sublime seems potentially reactionary and revolutionary at 
one and the same time" (120). This discovery may seem less surprising than 
predictable (in so far as it is an obvious byproduct of a critical practice that 
both aligns dissimilar texts to emphasize their Similarity and also identifies 
the dissimilarities in apparent resemblance). ill its more compelling version, 
however, Furniss's book provides a enormously acute-and indispensable-
insight into Burke and his achievement. For what Furniss has accomplished 
i 
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is to present the most sustained account I know of Burke's importance as an 
early analyst and practitioner of the art of recommendation and of its dual 
affinities with aesthetics and politics. 
The Johns Hopkins University Frances Ferguson 
History, Gender and Eighteenth-Century Literature, edited by Beth Fowkes To-
bin. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994. Pp. vii + 309. $50.00. 
Alexander Pope and his Eighteenth-Century Women Readers by Claudia N. 
Thomas. Carbondale and Edwardswille: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1994. Pp. xii + 309. $39.95. 
In the past ten or fifteen years, the study of eighteenth-century British lit--
erature and culture has been invigorated by a new attention to the relation 
between gender roles and cultural authority; both of the books under consid-
eration make valuable contributions to this trend in criticism, albeit in differ-
ent ways. The majority of the essays in the collection edited by Beth Fowkes 
Tobin clearly see themselves as pursuing the fruitful line of inquiry into the 
domestic sphere initiated by the literary critics Nancy Armstrong and Mary 
Poovey and the historians Catherine Hall and Lenore Davidoff; they are con-
cerned with evaluating the rise of women's moral authority during the eight-
eenth century, and with the growing importance of private, affective rela-
tionships for men and women alike. Methodologically, the essays in the To-
bin volume take the inclusion of "History" in its title seriously; they by no 
means confine themselves to the analysis of literary texts. In contrast, Clau-
dia Thomas's study of women writers' responses to Pope restricts its focus to 
female engagement with published literature. Like many of the essays in the 
Tobin collection, it is interested in disproving the notion that women in eigh-
teenth-century Britain were the passive victims of patriarchal authority; 
however, it refutes this notion not through reference to the other forms of 
cultural authority women might exert, but through detailed analysis of the 
kinds of critical acuity women readers and writers brought to bear on the 
documents of male-dominated literary culture available to them. 
According to Beth Fowkes Tobin's introduction, History, Gender and Eight-
eenth-Century Literature aims to contribute both to women's studies, and to 
the more general field of gender studies. Admirably, several of the essays do 
expand the rubric of gender studies to include the construction of masculin-
ity during the period, including Tobin's own excellent study of Arthur 
Young's writings and the creation of the profession of estate manager, and 
Shawn Lisa Maurer's fascinating discussion of filial relations in early period-
icals. The volume also argues against a feminist essentialism; instead it seeks 
to "encourage feminists to turn to history and culture in their analyses of lit-
erary texts" (1) and number of the essays inflect their discussions of gender 
roles with attention to pertinent social contexts. Susan Staves's article on 
"Fielding and the Comedy of Attempted Rape" continues her ground-break-
ing work on the imbrication of gender roles, legal concepts, and literary rep-
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resentation; both Maurer's piece and Beth Kowaleski-Wallace's article on 
"The Body, Class, and Art in Evelina and Frances Burney's Early Diaries" de-
lineate the complex ways that middle-class economic identity, artistic and 
literary culture, and gender roles interacted during this period; Kathryn 
Kirkpatrick's investigation of metaphors of property in conduct book litera-
ture provides another interesting discussion of the relationship betvveen class 
identities and constructions of femininity. 
On the whole, these essays seem more adept at discussing the intricacies 
of English domestic culture than they do at extending those analyses to the 
context of English colonialism and imperialism, Often, when they do look at 
the relation between literahlre and the international arena, they rely on gen-
eralizations, rather than producing the kind of historically nuanced readings 
for which the introduction seems to call. Diane Dugaw's article on Gay's se-
quel to the Beggar's Opera, Polly, for example, is useful for bringing this fasci-
nating text to readers' attention, but relies heavily on an unexamined com-
parison between English woman and Caribbean slaves, claiming that the 
play is a "satire that exposes the European heroic ideal as an ethos of slav-
ery: an enslaving gender ideology and an enslaving will to empire that mu-
tually construct each other" (39), Similarly, Ruth Perry's provocative com-
parison of four mid-eighteenth-century utopian novels ends with the pro-
posal that "where women's claims to the life of the mind are honored and 
encouraged. . it Signals a belief in human potential-across gender and 
across the social dimensions of race, class and nation as well" (176), While it 
seems certain that the status of white women in eighteenth-century England 
was in some relation to the status of cultural others, it may be too all-en-
compassing to see sexual and racial oppression as two homogeneous, mu-
tually exclusive, and thus analogous categories; such claims tend to ignore 
the heterogeneity of both dynamics, caused by the presence of gender differ-
ence in the colonies, for instance, or by ethnic differences among British 
women, Joseph Lew's article on "Mansfield Park and the Dynamics of Slav-
ery" is an insightful analysis of the relation between the use of patriarchal 
power in the colonies and in the domestic space, but even he relies on the 
tempting, but imprecise, analogy between white English women and slaves 
to ground his argument. Only Jill Campbell's article on Mary Wortley Mon-
tagu's descriptions of Turkey escapes from such generalizations, primarily 
because she discusses the interaction between two distinct sets of gender 
roles-English and Turkish-as well as examining the specificity of Lady 
Mary's responses to cultural differences. 
Finally, it needs to be said of this collection that it has a quite specific idea 
of the dominant concerns of eighteenth-century England, particularly of the 
latter half of this period. 111ese concerns include the reorganization of fami-
lial relationships, the structural importance of female propriety and moral 
authority to social organization, and the growth of evangelicalism as a 
source of feminine cultural power. While certainly not misplaced, a belief in 
the pre-eminence of these issues tends to produce an alternative canon of 
eighteenth-century texts, though I'm sure the contributors to this volume 
have nothing so prescriptive in mind. Yet the usual suspects are there: Sarah 
Scott, Fanny Burney, and two articles each on Hannah More and Jane Aus-
ten, Only two essays (on Gay and Montagu) treat subjects arguably not re-
i 
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lated to the construction of the middle classes. Thus, while the volume 
makes no claim to cover all the permutations of gender in eighteenth-cen-
tury culture, it seems significant that its articles make no mention of writers 
of amatory fiction in the early eighteenth-century-Haywood, Behn, or Man-
ley-the scandalous memoirists of mid-century-Charlotte Charke, among 
others-or the republican feminists of the later part of the century-Mary 
Wollstonecraft, for instance, or Mary Hays. I mention this not as a criticism, 
but to point out its potential implications for literary periodization. If femi-
nist literary historians see Mansfield Park (published 1814) as an eighteenth-
century novel, but overlook novels such as The Memoirs of Emma Courtney 
(published 1796), which argue against the priority of home and family in 
women's lives, they may find they have renounced a male-dominated If Age 
of Johnson" only to find themselves constrained by the parameters of an 
"Age of Domesticity." 
In contrast, Claudia Thomas's book covers one subject in considerable 
depth. This is an exhaustive, scrupulous investigation of the broad variety of 
women readers' responses to the work of Alexander Pope throughout the 
eighteenth century. She includes prose responses, as well as poetic ones, and 
writers who adopted Pope's formal qualities, along with writers who ex-
panded on his thematic concerns. After compiling this evidence, Thomas 
powerfully and persuasively concludes that 
Pope's eighteenth-century women readers suggest a model of fearless 
critical reading. Few of these women identified with Pope's construc-
tions of femininity. Instead, women appropriated and revised Pope's 
images to suit their own contexts, whether more genteel, more devout, 
or more feminist. Current analysis implying that contemporary women 
were somehow victimized by Pope's gendered rhetoric should recon-
sider the critical acuity with which his female adience often read. (244) 
Although one might say that Thomas thus Side-steps the potentially power-
ful impact of Pope's misogyny on his male readers, she nevertheless makes a 
crucial feminist statement in emphasizing female intelligence and critical 
agency. 
Thomas provides a number of reasons why Pope would be a central figure 
in the intellectual milieu of eighteenth-century women, both during his life-
time and after his death. Analyzing Pope's early translations, Thomas con-
cludes that such work "sought and addressed women readers" (21), provid-
ing openings for them either to learn from his poetic technique, or to enter 
into dialogue with his opinions. Like Valerie Rumbold in Women's Place in 
Pope's World (1989), Thomas also points to Pope's own marginalization in 
English culture, by virtue of his class, religion and deformity, to explain why 
women readers who were his contemporaries might have found him a more 
accessible ally or opponent than other writers of the time. As Pope assumed 
a position of cultural authority later in the century, Thomas argues, women's 
references to his work also served to legitimate their own writing. Denied 
the education that allowed male writers to signal authority through classical 
allusions, women turned to Pope to supply the place of the ancients. 
Thomas's work rests on her exceptional scholarly labor in tracing the exact 
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references to Pope's works in hundreds of relatively inaccessible texts by 
women writers. One unfortunate byproduct of this comprehensiveness is 
that, at times, it is difficult to follow the thread of the argument in the welter 
of citations Thomas supplies. TIlis painstaking accumulation of detail, how-
ever, produces one of the major strengths of Thomas's book. She is able to 
show convincingly that women writers did not hold a unitary view of Pope 
or his work: indeed, they could not, since they were such a varied group 
themselves. Thus, Pope provided an attractive interlocuter for such aristo-
cratic poets as Mary Wortley Montagu and Anne Finch for different reasons 
than those for which he proved a valuable model for the working-class poet 
Mary Leapor, or the crippled shopkeeper, Mary Chandler. TIlis illuminating 
description of the way class and social context produced a variety of pub-
lished female voices in eighteenth-century Britain makes Thomas's book an 
outstanding contribution to the project of historicization outlined by Tobin. 
Her attention to the public voices of women in the aristocracy and among 
the working classes also does the added work of showing that women's 
writing of the period was not completely circumscribed by domestic ideol-
ogy. 
University of Colorado Charlotte Sussman 
Dangerous Enthusiasm: William Blake and the Culture of Radicalism in the 1790s 
by Jon Mee. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. xvi + 251. $58.50. 
Witness Against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral Law by E. P. Thompson. 
New York: The New Press, 1993. pp. xxi + 234. $30.00. 
Traditional Blake studies have asked: was Blake a political radical or a 
mystic, a radical democrat or an elitist devotee of art and the imagination? 
For Mee and Thompson, Blake's radicalism is primary, the thing from which 
everything else derives. Following the example, to some extent, of David 
Erdman, whose Prophet Against Empire (1954; 3rd ed. 1977) influentially pre-
sented the case for the poetry's being understood in political terms and in re-
lation to the political conflicts of Blake's own period, Mee and Thompson in 
their very different ways contribute to and make more complex the argu-
ment for a radical Blake. It seems that today these are somewhat old-fash-
ioned concerns, as the relevance of historical context and the fact of Blake's 
radicalism have long been taken for granted. Moreover, the political! anti-
political dichotomies that informed decades of Blake studies now seem not 
just less interesting but beside the point, as what makes Blake's writing most 
distinctive does not seem to be describable in terms of that dichotomy. 
All too aware of his principal critical precursor, Mee in his introduction 
distinguishes his approach from that of Erdman. According to Mee, Erdman 
only illustrated the ways in which historical events are reflected in Blake's 
poetry; Mee, however, announces that he will deal more comprehensively 
with Blake's radjcal rhetoric, language, and poetic forms (1-2). That Erdman 
is as narrow and Mee as encompassing as the introduction declares is hardly 
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certain. Nevertheless, despite a few ill effects of the anxiety of influence, Mee 
makes some genuine contributions to Blake studies. 
Although concentrating on the work of the 1790s (excluding, however, The 
Four Zoas), Mee also makes an argument for understanding the whole of 
Blake. His thesis is that Blake is representative of 1790s radicalism. Hardly 
idiosyncratic, as Blake's image has often been, Blake was a bricoleur who 
combined the two main radical ideologies of religious" enthusiasm" and En-
lightenment rationalism. Blake's writing is "a variegated political discourse 
that was an eclectic combination of a variety of received repertoires" from 
these different traditions (4). Blake's belonging to a tradition of religious dis-
sent is hardly a novel claim, of course, but the poetry's status as bricolage 
from two seemingly incompatible traditions is original, I believe. Some crit-
ics, such as Marilyn Butler, have stressed Blake's Enlightenment lineage, at 
least in the 1790s work, but Mee is making unusually strenuous claims for 
Blake's rationalism. Even if those claims cannot be proven satisfactorily, they 
force us to think in ways we might not have otherwise. 
The first chapter is on popular religious "enthusiasm" and radical millen-
arianism, also the main focus of Thompson's book. Usefully describing the 
largely plebeian "prophetic" discourse of the 1790s, Mee provides a detailed 
context of religious rebellion within which Blake's own is coherent. Distin-
guishing betvveen a "pre-millenialism" that entailed a violent intervention by 
Christ and a "post-millenialism" that was politically optimistic and gradual-
ist, Mee persuasively situates Blake within the "unrespectable" radicalism of 
antinomians and messianic prophets. Stylistic qualities of Blake's writing-
parallelism, use of parable, deliberate obscurity-Mee attributes to the pro-
phetic tradition in its polite (Lowth) and unrespectable (Brothers) forms. Mee 
describes vividly the 1790s plebeian tradition of religiOUS dissent at its most 
"enthusiastic" and subversive, discussing figures unfamiliar to most Roman-
ticists: Garnet Terry, Jolm Wright, Samuel How, Jolm Cooke, William Hunt-
ington, George Ribeau, and James ReIly. The extent to which the seven-
teenth-century revolutionary Protestantism survived into the nineteenth cen-
tury is surprising (and is something Thompson investigates as well). Blake's 
affinities with revolutinary Dissent have been noted often, for example 
rather extensively by Michael Ferber (The Social Vision of William Blake, 1985), 
but Mee shows precisely how lively and active such Dissenters were in 
Blake's own London. Mee could have done more with the Swedenborgians, 
about whom there has been considerable research already, and who were the 
only religious group that we know with certainty with whom Blake had 
some kind of relationship. Nevertheless, one can no longer ignore the ener-
getic religious "enthusiasm" as an enabling context for Blake's own pro-
phetic assertions. As we learn more about the 1790s, Blake comes to seem 
less idiosyncratic, more typical (at least in certain ways). 
A few claims in the first chapter are not convincing. 111at J. S. Jordan, radi-
cal publisher of Paine, also published the antinomian Garnet Terry, is hardly 
a persuasive argument in itself for the compatibility betvveen rationalist and 
religious dissent Mee wants to find. Joseph Johnson published both Godwin 
and Malthus's attack on Godwin in the 1790s. It is indisputable that in the 
1790s (and later as well) political radicals were both religious and secular, 
even antireligious. Mee wants to insist there is something more than the ob-
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vious diversity of political radicalism. Another dubious claim in the first 
chapter is that Blake's unpopularity was caused by his "enthusiastic" style 
(46). First, the enthusiastic style did not make the numerous other authors 
Mee cites unpopular; obviously, there was a considerable audience for this 
style of writing but those readers did not, for whatever reasons, favor Blake. 
Second, the issue of Blake's readability and accessibility to readers is more 
complex than just matters of ideology and politics (see Stephen Behrendt's 
recent book on Blake's readers, Rending William Blake, 1992). Blake is a diffi-
cult poet whose difficulty remains even after we note the various ideological 
factors. Students in my Romantic literature courses find Blake much more 
difficult than any of the other poets we read, and only so much can be fac-
tored out as my pedagogical incompetence. The fact is Blake's poetry re-
quires a kind of reading that most readers find wlUsually challenging. One 
has to assume that Blake's first readers were similary challenged; it is hardly 
necessary to find ideological causes for interpretive difficulty. 
The second chapter focuses on antiquarianism, popular and scholarly, 
from Toland and Macpherson to Ritson. Mee shows how an English primi-
tivism developed indigenously and in relation to Rousseau's. In Blake's writ-
ing the priestly Druids are opposed by the prophetic Bards, both of whom 
existed already as antiquarian types. Mee informatively glosses the tree sym-
bol in Blake and in antiquarian writing. Especially useful are the pages on 
Joseph Ritson (113-20), the radical antiquarian scholar who debated the more 
popular and conservative Percy. Although hardly the first to show the poet's 
connections with antiquarianism, Mee shows how this living tradition 
shaped feaures of Blake's writing. 
The third chapter on mythography and politics, like the last chapter on 
biblical criticism, presses the case for Blake's Enlightenment rationalism 
more strenuously than I think can be sustained, but Mee nevertheless de-
picts vividly several of the intellectual contexts within which Blake wrote 
and thought. Most impressive, perhaps, is Mee's showing how Los is shaped 
in part by the influence of Erasmus Danvin, but as soon as he concedes the 
difference between Darwin's materialism and Blake's divine humanity, we 
are once again back where we started, with a counter-Enlightenment Blake 
and the motto, "Mock on, mock on, Voltaire, Rousseau." It is nevertheless 
useful to know that during the English Enlightenment even Christian apol-
ogsts were forced to deal \vith mythic imaginative constructions. Mee, how-
ever, aligns Blake rather too quickly, I believe, with the anti-Christians like 
F<line and Volney; is not Blake also a Christian apologist, however unortho-
dox? Mee does not think so. 
In the fourth chapter Mee illustrates aspects of the Lambeth prophecies by 
showing the congruence between Blake's ideas and those of rationalist bibli-
c.JI critics like Paine, Geddes, and Volney, insisting that the prophecies arc 
"politic:ll." However, insofar as Blake's satire constructs an opposition be-
tween the "stony Law" of t'doses and the loving imagination of Jesus, it 
merely exploits the always already existing anti-Judaism at the heart of the 
most orthodox Christianity; one hardly needs the rationalist critique for 
statemL'nts <1g<1inst the "brutillity" of the Old Testament. Moreover, if the 
L<Hllbdh prophecies are "politic<1l, then in wh<1t W<1ys? The category of the 
pl1litical i:-; ,) \'l'xed one in the book. \Vhen (vIce takes critics to task for their 
rt 
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political shortcomings, he is least helpful: "Critics like [Leslie] Tannenbaum, 
ever eager to read political quietism in Blake's texts as early in the 17905 as 
possible ... " (209). There is a confusion here between people, who can be 
either politically active or quietist, and writing, which carmot be either. The 
confusion is Mee's, not TaIU1enbaum's. ll1ere is no evidence of which r am 
aware that Blake was ever politically active. He could have joined the Lon-
don Corresponding Society like his friend and fellow-engraver Sharp, but he 
seems not to have done so. If he participated in meetings, riots, demonstra-
tions, or signed protest petitions, such participation has not left any evi-
dence. However rebellious the meanings one can find in The Marriage of 
Heave" and He/I, probably Blake's most radical text, one should not call it 
"activist," nor should one call liTo Tirzah" or Milton "quietist." The opposi-
tion is false and misleading in tvvo ways, suggesting that Blake renounced a 
politics there is no evidence he ever asserted in the first place, and that writ-
ing automatically gets translated into identifiable political deeds. 
The conclusion is the book's weakest and shortest section, arguing w1per-
suasively that Blake's lack of popularity was because of his peculiar syn-
thesis of rationalist and religious dissent, the former appealing to a bour-
geois audience that found the latter plebeian and distastefully "enthusiastic" 
(223-24). Hypothetically one might grant the possibility that a bourgeois 
readership \vould see Blake as too radical, but what about the large reader-
ship of radical literature? Paine sold in the hundreds of thousands. Had 
Blake's primary aim been to reach the plebeian readership for political writ-
ing, one presumes he could have done so. 
However imperfect, Mee's book is a genuine contribution to Blake studies, 
and especially to 1790s literary studies in general. 
The late E. P. Thompson's book is more than just another contribution to 
Blake studies because Thompson was a political figure and thinker of con-
siderable stature. It is ironic that this indefatigable political activist should 
author a final book about a poet who might never have participated in actual 
politics. That is just one of the ironies that arises reading these nvelve chap-
ters. 
Thompson writes extensively on the antinomian context, most particularly 
the Muggletonians, a revolutionary sect from the Puritan revolution of the 
seventeenth century, and in general the late eighteenth-century antinomians 
who carried into the nineteenth century some of the earlier revolutionary 
"Ranting" and "enthusiasm." Thompson writes movingly, with sympathy 
and compassion, about the sect he believes is closest to representing Blake's 
own position, so that even if make were not an actual Muggletonian, he was 
a virtual one. \Vhereas I'vJee's Blake is a bricolcllr combining various discours-
es, Thompson's is a single coherent figure, an antinomian, understandable 
only as such. Thompson even traced down the last living Muggletonian in 
England, helping to transfer the sect's records and papers to the British Li-
brary, Additionally, there are some astute pages of literary philology, as 
Thompson pro\'ides glosses on the "Divine Image," chartered and marks (for 
"London"), and the "Human Abstract." 
Thompson was not able to find a definite link between Blake and the Lon-
don :'viuggletonians of the day, Perhaps Blake's mother's family had some 
j\.lugglctonian5, but that is the closest link Thompson could find. Thomp-
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son's argument depends less on proving Blake's membership in the group 
than in sharing its worldview, and on that issue he provides some compel-
ling evidence. Expanding upon the findings of A. L. Morton, who first linked 
Blake with the "everlasting gospel" of antinomianism, Thompson describes 
the Muggletonians as the sect most Blakean among all the various dissenting 
religious influences to which the poet was exposed. In chapter six TIlompson 
shows how, among the various survivors of the seventeenth-cenhrry revolu-
tionary conflict, the Muggletonians stressed a fierce, Blakean opposition to a 
demonized "reason." They also repudiated the "moral law" in favor of the 
"everlasting gospel" of love, narrated the Fall with Blakean symbolism of the 
serpent copulating with Eve, repudiated entirely both priesthood and tradi-
tionalliturgy (they met in a public house and sang songs composed by the 
various Muggletonian "prophets"). When God became Christ, according to 
the Muggletonians, there was then no other God but Christ. Thereafter, di-
vinity was an entirely human phenomenon. One of the few groups to whom 
the logiC and imagery of The Book of Urizen would not have been utterly 
strange was the Muggletonians. Unlike the Quakers, who accomodated 
themselves with the "Beast" of power ("hegemony"), the Muggletonians did 
not budge, refused to adjust their beliefs to the new conditions, even if they 
did cease to make actual war against the state and its church. 
Thompson's will be the standard book of reference for Blake's antinomian-
ism until a better one comes along. The antinomianism needs, however, to 
be more fully contextualized in terms of both Anglican doctrine and espe-
cially the Methodist movement, so that we can see just how "dissenting" 
Blake's religious ideas actually were. Witness Against the Beast has surpris-
ingly little to say about the Methodists, who attracted in the eighteenth cen-
tury far more plebeian adherents than the old Puritans. For a book that deals 
with theology rather extensively, it is also disappointing that it draws upon 
so little theology except antinomianism. Others will have to do this contexu-
talizing work. 
As Thompson positions himself outside Blake scholarship, so I feel justi-
fied in doing the same, and asking how Blake fits into Thompson's overall 
writing. The key chapter is, I think, the seventh, "Anti-Hegemony." Accord-
ing to Thompson, the Muggletonians and other antinomians "were hege-
mony's eightenth-century opposition" (109). Blake, then, although he might 
never have been politically active, is for Thompson a political exemplar by 
embodying the position of "anti-hegemony." In Thompson's historically rela-
tivist scheme, Hegelian-Marxist Reason most cunningly and ironically de-
scended upon an obscure London engraver who articulated the revolution-
ary message for that time, was indeed a "witness" against the "beast" of 
"hegemony." Blake provides the human face lacking in the rationalist mate-
rialism of Paine and Volney (and by implication, Marxism), the spiritual sub-
stance for atheistic radicalism. 1110mpson has long searched for something to 
rectify what he saw as the inadequacies of Marxism. His William Morris 
book, first written while Thompson was a Communist, tried to yoke Marxist 
"necessity" with Romantic imagination. Morris was the poet who became a 
militant, while at the end of his career as a militant Thompson appropriates 
a poet. It does not seem at all that Thompson was responding to religious 
stirrings of his own in his last years; rather, his very Marxist commitment 
c' 
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from the start required a spiritual, imaginative, ethical "supplement." Morris 
was an acceptable additive because he was, after all, a militant activist in the 
Marxist movement. Blake was equally acceptable because of his plebeian so-
cial status and the absence of any signs of compromise with the powers that 
be (that latter assumption is more than a little questionable). As Blake's reli-
gion can be construed plausibly as humanistic, it can coexist, if uneasily, 
with Marxist atheistic materialism. If Blake can be hitched to "anti-hege-
mony" and appropriated for Marxism, Thompson has effectively increased 
the prestige, especially the "humanistic" dimension, of a Marxism that is be-
ginning to seem now almost as antiquated as Muggletonianism. 
Blake hardly needs the help that Marxism now does. That, however, is an-
other subject for another occasion. Nevertheless, there is a real issue that 
Thompson's book raises: who can appropriate Blake? for what purposes? 
Thompson argues against the claims of critics like "Miss Raine" (however 
much he disliked Raine, did he also have to use the sexist designation?), 
who align Blake with the occult and mystical, with such passion and convic-
tion that clearly the stakes are high. Do only certain kinds of poets provoke 
this kind of battle for ownership? I don't think there is a similar battle over, 
say, Shakespeare or Wordsworth, but there is one over Shelley (or there used 
to be). Blake, like Shelley, wrote some of the most radical verse in English, so 
that later radicals have wanted to preserve that radicalism, but both poets 
also wrote verse that might be radical in some senses but is also quite reada-
ble in other ways-Neoplatonic, mystical, and so on. Then what? Blake's 
case is more difficult because we have so little to go on other than the actual 
poetry, but Thompson's book does help us, I think, in reading the poet. That 
seemingly otherworldly, apolitical meanings are more accurately interpreted 
in terms of a decaying antinomian tradition does indeed matter. 
With Mee and Thompson we are a long way from Frye's "Orc cycle" and 
Bloom's apocalyptic prophet against nature. The Bronowski-Erdman tradi-
tion of reading Blake as a radical, which Mee and Thompson continue, has 
been strongest in establishing contexts and providing discrete gloss; it has 
been weakest where the Frye-Bloom tradition has been strongest, in prOVid-
ing overall readings of individual poems and the entire Blakean oeuvre. Nei-
ther Mee nor Thompson rectifies the weaknesses of the tradition in which 
they are working. 
Neither book deals with Joseph Viscomi's work, which was published too 
late for either of them to mention, but Viscomi's Blake and The Idea of the Book 
(Princeton, 1993) and his subsequent work will probably redefine Blake 
studies in dramatic ways that neither Mee's nor Thompson's will. Viscomi's 
encyclopedic research into the processes of Blake's printmaking and book-
making suggests a "Blake" adequately described by neither Frye nor Erd-
man. Although the Bronowski-Erdman tradition will continue to provide us 
with local insights and informative contexts, the most exciting future of 
Blake studies seems to belong elsewhere. 
1I\Taync State UniversihJ Michael Scrivener 
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Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading by 
Richard J. Gerrig. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. Pp. xii + 274, 
$30.00. 
Early in Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of 
Reading, Richard Gerrig recalls the disciplinary divide opened between psy-
chology and literary criticism through Wimsatt and Beardsley's invocation of 
the "affective fallacy," the false hope of grounding criticism in psychological 
perspectives. Gerrig, an associate professor of psychology at Yale, recalls this 
moment to make amends with literary theorists: Ifin the decades since Wim-
satt and Beardsley stated their objections," Gerrig writes, "researchers have 
made progress toward developing an experimental psychology of reader re-
sponse that is not so easily assailed" (26). In the intervening decades, literary 
criticism has also witnessed sweeping changes, becoming more interested as 
well in the psychology of reading. Gerrig's book seeks to take advantage of 
these trajectories, to offer an interdisciplinary beginning, and to start draw-
ing together the insights of the two seemingly different research agendas in 
an attempt to redress the affective fallacy, finding cornmon ground with lit-
erary critics in psychology's accounts of a reader's cognition. 
Gerrig proposes that it is in fact the reader's act of cognitive integration of 
textual cues with memories that defines the experience of the "narrative 
world" of literature. Gerrig develops this cognitive point into a phenomenol-
ogical account of reading a narrative by claiming that actively participating 
in the construction of a narrative, a reader is transported, is so invested in 
the experience as to be cognitively removed from the immediate surround-
ings. This basic position provides the framework through which Gerrig pro-
ceeds to describe, throughout the book, the cognitive and phenomenological 
overlap in reading. While he derives his arguments about cognition primar-
ily from his own empirical research, the results verify and extend well-es-
tablished psychological theories. Such theories, that readers "make" meaning 
in response to an active, contextualized experience with texts, also have 
well-established parallels with reader-response theory. 
One of the more thoroughly worked out versions of these connections is 
found in the social-cognitive theories of James Wertsch, who exploits the dia-
logic literary theories of M. M. Bakhtin and the closely allied psychological 
theories of Bakhtin's fellow countryman, Lev Vygotsky. As Wertsch's theo-
ries are current in American cognitive research, and as he sets up a theory of 
textual cognition and narrativity through his use of Bakhtin, I was quite sur-
prised to find no mention of him in Gerrig's Book. In fact I was quite sur-
prised to find such a limited use of literary theory, especially of reader-re-
sponse theory, in a book promising to bridge a disciplinary divide. In addi-
tion, his use of literary examples was highly circumscribed, limited primarily 
to contemporary realist fiction. Gerrig did, however, make extensive use of 
Anglo-American linguistics and ordinary language philosophy. As a result of 
his choices, I found myself growing wary of Gerrig's claims, suspicious of 
his motives for wanting to generate accounts of the phenomenological expe-
rience of reading from accounts of the psychology of reading. In particular 
I wanted to know how his work answers to concerns in literary theory in 
general. 
ill' 
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The answers came in chapter three, "Participatory Responses," where Ger-
rig discusses a reader's participation in a narrative. As a counter-example of 
participation, he states that readers who are so disinvested in a narrative as 
to be uninclined to yell "Watch Out!" when danger threatens an unsuspect-
ing character, are choosing "not to participate in the appropriate way" (66), 
What might it mean to suggest the "appropriate way" to respond? For Ger-
rig, delineating the appropriateness of a reader's response is synonymous 
with identifying the cognitive dimensions of reading. Explicitly developing a 
cognitive perspective through which to appropriate the experience of read-
ing, Gerrig implicitly develops a criterion for an appropriate narrative expe-
riel1Ce. Under the guise of empirical veracity, Gerrig universalizes the phe-
nomenology of reading from cognitive experiments limited to experiences of 
realist fiction in which readers are consh·ucted so as to seek after authorial 
intention. His conclusion to this chapter summarizes this quite neatly, "p-re-
sponses [cognitive responses} often function to enrich emotional and aes-
thetic aspects of a narrative world: by p-respondi11g, readers draw them-
selves solidly into the narrative world" (96). 
Yet Gerrig's argument seems to me to do more than attempt a scientizing 
of the experience of reading literature. In the context of the "crisis" in theory 
in English Studies, and the more general cultural debates over the value of 
literature and the professionalization of its study, I read Gerrig's arguments 
as an assault on the institutional and cultural role of the literary intellectual. 
This became apparent to me in his misuse of Stanley Fish's work, one of 
the few theorists Gerrig argues from. Describing reading as a kind of conver-
sational practice, Gerrig draws a direct link to Stanley Fish's concept of "in-
terpretive community." Rather than accepting the full force of Fish's point 
that what counts as meaning, that what even counts as text, is inseparable 
from community practices, Gerrig reintroduces the author's intent, by con-
straining a reader's interpretation through the textual cues and linguistic fea-
tures of the text. In Gerrig's view, readers can get the author's meaning be-
cause they "are able to review parts of a text that may figure heavily in the 
wayan author establishes meaning" (122). Certainly there is a text lo read 
and respond to, but the point, precisely the point Fish develops at length, is 
that the specific features of the text don't matter; what really matters is the 
context and the constraints "ivithin which the text is acted upon. 
Gerrig under-appreciates Fish, but he also comes out strongly against Der-
rida in his discussion of John Searle. Gerrig reasserts that Derridil's demon-
stration in LilJlited, II1C., "in no way undermines the claim that he<1rer5, c1J1d 
readers, obligatorily strive to recover unique intentions" (139). Affirming the 
"psycholinguistic gestalt for theories of 'actual behavior.''' Gerrig concludes, 
"Derridil might work to reform the rules of 'reading' but he (<lnnot legislatc 
cognitiyc processes out of existence" (140). Perhaps not. But Gcrrig hcls once 
iJgiJin missed the full force of the ilTgument. The point is, <It lea;:;t from il 
poststrllctur<lli;:;t perspectiYc, that the "cogniti\'e processes" arc ill\\,ilys cll-
ready written, clnd they are most certainly rewritten in cogniti\·C' psychol(lgy, 
cl discourse th<lt then rein5cribes them in clcts like reading, producing cl cklin 
nf signified;:; without <lny solid nriginar~· grounding in either inlL'ntinn (lr 
cngnitinn. 
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In the final chapter, referring to the famous passage in Plato's Republic 
banishing poets from the ideal state, Gerrig offers what seems his real inter-
est in narrative. Inferring that poetry must matter a great deal, he proposes 
in this chapter to develop a psychological theory "to match Plato's certainty 
that stories matter" (197). Does Gerrig think then that poets should be ban-
ished? Not hardly. Rather he invokes Plato to enter the contentious debate 
about just how it is poetry, stories, and narratives "matter." He argues that 
"fictional information has real-world effects. fI Gerrig's aim is clear, to trace 
out real-world effects that align with "psychological models of the uptake of 
fictional information, both with respect to mental representations and to 
moment-by-moment processing" (202). 
In making this claim, Gerrig misrepresents the tradition of literary criti-
cism as simply Coleridgeian "aestheticism" (202). Invoking "professional 
readers," he states, "theories of literary criticism that attempt to regulate 
real-world effects of fiction out of existence fail to capture the real-world ac-
tivities of competent readers. What I suggest ... is that theories of the expe-
rience of fiction have quite regularly obscured the pathways through which 
fictions can have good or ill effects on such readers" (207). Gerrig argues that 
the pedagogical implications of this view, that students as readers can be 
trained to "experience fictional narratives in such a way that they could treat 
them only as aesthetic objects" (203), runs counter to empirical evidence of 
the deep /I cognitive structure" of narrative experiences: "Whatever new lan-
guage games theorists might invent to strengthen the [aesthetic] ideal will 
necessarily clash with inherent psychological properties" (203). 
I take exception to Gerrig's assault on English Studies from the Psychology 
Department, his view that literature departments in the institutionalization 
of their reading strategies aestheticize and make fiction irrelevant. Not only 
are these claims uninformed, they rest on positivistic presuppositions. Cer-
tainly the processes of decoding, of reading, that Gerrig treats as natural are 
socialized-are manufactured through the organization and dissemination of 
texts within a culture. But Gerrig does not broach the question in this way, 
and as a result of not recognizing, as Wertsch does, the social dimension of 
cognition, he only provides a proscriptive perspective on strategies of read-
ing he sees as not only "unnatural" but therefore as counterproductive. 
Gerrig concludes this final chapter with a further suggestion for the place 
of aestheticized reading: readers may train themselves and others to "under-
take special analysis of a text based on the beliefs that authors might pur-
posely conceal meanings and that meanings might be hidden from even the 
authors themselves" (240). By exposing the irrelevancies that arise from ov-
ertheorizing or aestheticizing literature, Gerrig suggests that the aggressively 
controlled reading of literature requires a passive surrender to the more im-
mediate, cognitive experiences of reading. Has he thereby answered the 
affective fallacy? Not in any satisfactory way. If he had read Stanley Fish 
more closely, he might have realized, "being interdisciplinary is so very hard 
to do." 
\VaYllc State Ulliversity Richard Marback 
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Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity edited by John R. Gillis. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xii + 290. $35.00. 
The introduction by John R. Gillis to this volume of essays provides a suc-
cinct orientation to the subjects subsequently examined while also whetting 
the reader's appetite to pursue irrunediately the different directions outlined. 
These studies' common goal is deceptively simple: given the status of mem-
ory and identity as political and social constructs and of their relationship as 
historically situated, "the record of that relationship can be traced through 
various forms of commemoration," i.e. various modes of coordinating "indi-
vidual and group memories, whose results may appear consensual when 
they are in fact the product of processes of intense contest, struggle, and, in 
some instances, annihilation" (5). Providing historical as well as sociocultural 
foci, these essays span several centuries (from early modern Europe to the 
present) and societies (from the Middle East to North America), and Gillis's 
remarks situate the development of the memory !identity nexus through the 
overlapping phases of the "pre-national" (up to the late 1700s), the "nation-
al" (end of the eighteenth century to the 1960s) and the current, "post-na-
tional" phase. 
Some of the points that Gillis emphasizes are: the shifting class and fixed 
gender and race specificities of commemorative initiatives from one phase to 
the next; the struggles that occur between social groups when challenged by 
proposed commemorative events; the move from commemoration of the 
dead to the living and the consequent change of rituals; and above all, the 
role that "concerted forgettings" play in all processes of remembering (7-18). 
Underscoring the political stakes in the memory lidentity relationship, Gillis 
argues that it was not until the 1960s and their aftermath that "a new icono-
clasm" develops resulting in the search for "usable pasts capable of serving 
the heterogeneity of new groups that had become active on the national and 
international stage: racial and sexual minorities, women, youth, and dozens 
of new nations and ethnic groups aspiring to sovereign status" (19). How-
ever, the "democratization of memory" for those groups developing new 
identities becomes "profanation, or, what is worse, cultural suicide" for other 
groups invested in the sacredness of the nation-state (19). Hence, the battle 
lines are drawn on political, cultural and even commercial fronts, but Gillis 
maintains that in this transitional "era of plural identities," the publicizing of 
memories and identities is more necessary than ever in order to ensure "the 
democratic processes by which individuals and groups come together to dis-
cuss, debate, and negotiate the past and, through this process, define the fu-
ture" (20). 
The two essays constituting the volume's first section (entitled "The Prob-
lem of Identity and Memory") provide a solid basis from which the three 
subsequent sections can proceed. Richard Handler's opening "Is 'Identity' a 
Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?" raises suspicions about this fundamental 
term as both a scholarly and cultural construct since its seeming "natural-
ness" belies the distinctive trait of "identity" as constituted within entirely 
situated contexts. Following recent scholarship that has emphasized various 
modes of constructing "identity," Handler argues that groups are best un-
derstood not as "bounded objects in the natural world ... [but as] symbolic 
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processes that emerge and dissolve the particular contexts of action," a 
perspective requiring a language" other than the discourse of identity in or-
der to be able to comment creatively upon that discourse" (30). From his ex-
amination of both non-Western and recent Western conceptions (e.g. in Jane 
Austen's novels) of individuality and social collectivity, Handler concludes 
that not only is our twentieth-century conception of "identity" inadequate 
for application to other periods and cultures, but also that "identity" contrib-
utes little to scholarship on "nationalist activism, historical preservation, and 
the creation of tradition" (37). He recognizes, however, the politically deli-
cate problem raised by this laller objection since groups who frequently tum 
to such identity claims (e.g. ethnic leaders, ministries of culture) do so for 
legitimate political reasons, however hegemonic and ideologically oppressive 
such claims may ultimately be. 11ms, Handler argues that the focus of schol-
arly critique should be on mainstream, and usually unchallenged, identity 
claims while constructively pointing out to minority groups the conse-
quences of promoting homogeneous cultural consh'ucts without due reflec-
tion (38). 
David Lowenthal pursues similar lines of thought in the second chapter, 
"Identity, Heritage and History," stating that the title's first two terms cur-
rently "swim in a self-congratulatory swamp of collective memory" (41), an 
attitude often fuelling rivalry and conflicts. Having traced the submission of 
selfhood to collective consciousness in past memoirs, Lowenthal suggests 
that "heritage," once referring only to the attributes of the elite, now is a 
popular link, "distill[ing] the past into icons of identity, bonding us with 
precursors and progenitors, with our own earlier selves, and with our prom-
ised successors" (43). While remaining "metaphorically ancestra!," says Low-
enthal, heritage today functions mainly "to confirm the identity and boost 
the solidarity of nations and self-assured ethnic groups" (44). Heritage cate-
gories now become homogenized due, in large part, to global interdepend-
ence, and tend to exclude other groups' claims to virtue, civilization, and 
comparable worth. And the requirement that socially binding traditions be 
accepted on faith, not by reasoning, now distingUishes heritage from history: 
"Heritage thus defies empirical analysis; it features fantasy, invention, mys-
tery, error" (49), through diverse modes of memorialization and amnesia. To 
the current rise of nationalist claims also corresponds the rise of extreme ten-
sion and conflict, as the evening news drives home daily, in the form of ri-
valries, disputes, and rhetorical bombast. Lowenthal concludes that compari-
son between heritages, rather than myopic insistence on exclusivity, can con-
tribute to quelling such conflicts: "National heritage emerges from linkages 
(and rivalries) among all the identities that inhabit us" (54). 
In order to highlight properly the different modes of commemoration con-
stitutive of identity, memory and heritage, each subsequent section develops 
a particular (yet quite broad) focus. 
In part two, "Memory in the Construction of National Identities," David 
Cressy considers the role of dynastic and church authorities in shaping pop-
ular understanding of early modern England's national memories and com-
memorations; Jolm Brodner studies the debates over (official vs. vernacular) 
public memory with special focus on the stages of commemoration during 
this century in Cleveland, Ohio; Eric Davis examines the museum as form 
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and site of social control of both "high" and "low culture" in modern Iraq; 
and Yael Zerubavel juxtaposes the overlapping discourses of "history" and 
"legend" in Israeli commemoration of the (1920) Tel Hai battle. 
In part three, "Memories of War and Wars over Memory," Kirk Savage de-
fines the strategic functions of the Civil War memorial for recasting com-
memoration away from black emancipation and toward national reconcilia-
tion and harmony; Thomas W. Laqueur describes the "new era of remem-
brance" brought about through "naming" the European war dead as a 
process of memorialization following World War I; G. Kurt Piehler examines 
the United States government's strategy of creating the Gold Star Mother fol-
lowing World War I as a means to identify motherhood, and a certain kind 
of woman's identity, with the selfless sacrifice of their sons in defense of the 
nation; and Daniel J. Sherman studies the World War I monument in France 
as a site for conjoining II a variety of discourses and practices: local and na-
tionalf commercial and artisticf high and lowf and ultimately perhapsf his-
tory and memory" (187). 
In part four, "Politics of Memory and Identity," Rudy J. Koshar considers 
the role o( and contradictions withinf historic preservation of buildings and 
towns in Germany as a privileged mode both of memorialization and of cop-
ing with forms of nationalist insecurity; Herman Lebovics situates the cul-
tural and political debates around the vexed and shifting questions of the 
Hessential France fl and authentic French heritagef focussing on cultural wars 
in the 1930s and 19605; and Claudia Koonz examines the struggles of memo-
rialization and historical amnesia related to concentration camp memorial 
museums in post-World War II Germany, East and West. 
With these brief summaries, I mean merely to orient readers to what these 
essays might offer quite generally, leaving it to each reader, depending on 
his/her own interestsf to pursue the in-depth process of discovery. I hope to 
have made clear the common effort by all the contributors to follow the 
broad lines of inquiry established in the introduction and opening chapters. 
In each of the cultural contexts examinedf the contributors emphasize the di-
verse processes by which identity and memory are reciprocally constructed 
through commemoration and, concomitantlYf how these constructions are 
variably exploited within particular socio-political and economic circum-
stances. Far from being rabidly relativist however, the contributors draw 
conclusions based on very sound historical data succinctly presented. Yet f in 
doing so, they also avail themselves of many critical insights that have arisen 
from recent debates on the relationship of history to narrative and discourse 
theories. Hencef this volume offers not only an array of analyses of specific 
socio-historical practices, but also important examples of an unselfconscious 
and highly productive approach to cultural studies. 
Wayne State University Charles J. Stivale I' 
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Discovering Difference: Contemporary Essays in American Culture edited by 
Christoph K. Lohmann. Bloommgton and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1993. Pp. 203. $29.95, cloth; $12.95, paper. 
In a speech entitled, "The Transformation of Silence into Language and 
Action," poet Audre Larde, writes about how a brush with cancer forced her 
to reevaluate her life. She reflects, "In becoming forcibly and essentially 
aware of my mortality, and of what I wished and wanted for my life, how-
ever short it might be, priorities and omissions became strongly etched in a 
merciless light, and what I most regretted were my silences" (Sister Outsider 
[Freedo, CA: The Crossing Press, 1984], 41). As an African-American lesbian 
poet, Larde is acutely aware of how people perceive difference as a barrier 
rather than a bridge to each other. When difference creates distance within 
the academy, Lorde urges scholars "not to hide behind the mockeries of sep-
arations that have been imposed upon us and which we so often accept as 
our own" (Larde, 43). At lUliversities, allegiances to a specific discipline, re-
search methodology, or subject or inquiry are some of the ways in which 
scholars build these fences of separation. For Lorde, only open dialogue can 
act as an antidote to this form of intellectual disengagement-"for it is not 
difference that immobilizes us, but silence. And there are so many silences to 
be broken" (Lorde, 44). 
In the introduction of the book, Discovering Difference: Contemporary Essays 
in American Culture, editor Christoph K. Lohmann presents the anthology as 
a collaborative effort in the spirit of Lorde's sentiments. At the onset, Loh-
mann expresses the hope that readers, like the audience of the lecture series 
on which the book is based, will experience "listening to different voices 
speaking to each other in open dialogue rather than for the purpose of wag-
ing intellectnal tnrf battles" (xi). In literary and cultnral stndies, these "tnrf 
battIes"-according to Lohmann-are being waged between "two warring 
factions: the 'traditionalists' and the 'poststructuralists' or 'multicul-
tnralists'" (ix). For both sides in this academic contest the stakes are high. As 
Lohmann notes, "course offerings, degree requirements, and tenure and pro-
motion criteria" often hinge on who decides what defines a field of inquiry, 
and the dissension that arises between the competing parties has a "polariz-
ing effect" (ix). 
Discovering Difference, "a deliberately eclectic collection of essays [that] 
may please neither the outside observer of the academic scene nor the spe-
cialist within the adademy" (x), presents the alternatives of "dialogic engage-
ment rather than rhetorical aggression" (xi). Using a chronological frame-
work, the essays in Discovering Difference cover a broad expanse of time-
from 1492 when Columbus "discovers" America to the 1992 Anita Hill/ 
Clarence Thomas controversy. Within this large sweep across the centuries, 
the anthology proceeds to live up to its self-professed "eclectic" label as it of-
fers ten essays engaging in the theme of "difference" from markedly different 
perspectives. Discovering Difference includes readings of literature, film, and 
television, as well as cultural and literary theory. 
The literature essays alone attest to the diversity of the Discovering Differ-
ence project. In orie of the first articles in the collection, Eva Chemiavsky uses 
Susanna Rowson's Charlotte Temple to illustrate how, in mid-nineteenth-
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century Americaf sentimental novels both contribute to and complicate lithe 
emergent ideology of the bourgeois nuclear family" (36), as the women read-
ers of these novels established a "collective identity" which reinforced their 
sense of exclusion from the republican political order. Jonathan Elmer's es-
say, "Poe, Plagiarism, and the Prescriptive Right of the Mob," examines how 
the themes of Poe's story, "William Wilson," reflect its author's own opin-
ions about plagiarism, which correspond to larger social anxieties in the 
nineteenth century about the "nature of identity ... in what we might call 
the mass-textual world of publishing" (69). In his essay, "The Underheard 
Reader in the Writing of the Old Southwest," James H. Justus offers another 
perspective on the repercussions of the "mass-textual world of publishing" 
in nineteenth-century America. In the 1830s and 1840s, the writing of South-
western humorists achieved mass appeal-culminating in the work of Mark 
Twain. Justus argues that while this style of writing celebrates and uses re-
gional dialects for much of its humor, the humorists themselves rely on 
standard literary conventions to tell these stories, which subvert the power 
of "backwoods" vernacular speech. Justus writes, "[t]he authority lies not 
with those primitives who speak with vernacular bite but with the moderns 
who mimic those idioms in writing" (55). From this perspective, the South-
western humorists' attempts to document difference-the "Otherness" of the 
"backwoods" dialed-in literary forms accentuate their distance from that 
oral subculture. 
Alongside these articles on literature, the anthology also confronts the 
larger theoretical questions inherent in "discovering difference." In the essay, 
"Why Did the European Cross the Ocean? A Seventeenth-Century Riddle," 
Myra Jehlen discusses the distinction betwen the terms "other" and "differ-
ence," as well as the history of their use from Montaigne to Todorov. Jehlen 
contends that while '!lother' seems to cast the speaker's cultural interlocutors 
in an inferior position ... [t]he term 'different' proposes to right this imbal-
ance by granting others identities of their own" (2). Regardless of the im-
provement of "different" over "other," Jehlen argues for the use of a third 
term, "contested zone," "meaning cultural areas and social regions that dif-
ferent groups seek to define each in its own way" (12). Similar to Jehlen's 
agenda, Cary Wolfe's article, "Antinomies of Liberalism: The Politics of 'Be-
lief' and the Project of Americanist Criticism," also offers a critique of the 
ways in which scholars perceive" difference" by examining the dominance of 
liberalism in Americanist scholarship through a close analYSis of the work of 
Walter Benn Michaels. 
Two articles, Michel Rogin's, "The Great Mother Domesticated: Sexual Dif-
ference and Sexual Indifference in D. W. Griffith's Intolerance," and Carolyn 
A. Mitchell's, "Choicelessness as Choice: The Conflation of Racism and Sex-
ism," which analyze visual rather than literary texts, confirm the ilnpressive 
range of Discovering Difference. For Rogin, close readings of the themes and 
images of D. W. Griffith's Intolerance reveal pervasive cultural anxieties 
about the power of female sexuality in early twentieth-century America in 
light of the birth control movement. Mitchell's article examines the Clarence 
Thomas/ Anita Hill controversy and foregrounds the power of the television 
camera, which is "capable of manipulating public knowledge of an event, 
and ultimately, shaping public opinion" (190). Mitchell interprets the tele-
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vised image of Thomas as he testified at his coniinnation hearing. To un-
cover the political underpirnlings of this image, Mitchell analyzes the camer-
a's framing the nominee, against a backdrop of his wife, Virginia Thomas, 
and Republican Senator John Danforth, which accentuates the absence of An-
ita Hill. Mitchell's essay contributes to her strong belief that the public 
should not be "ignorant of the camera's politics" (198). 
While Mitchell's essay addresses a contemporary event, three essays in 
Discovering Difference directly engage in questions of historical change. ln 
"American Literature Discovers Columbus/' Terence Martin traces the multi-
ple ways that Columbus has been mythologized in the United States from 
the eighteenth century to the present. Through this history, Martin illustrates 
how shifts in America's national identity have required revisions of the Co-
lumbus myth from "discoverer" as hero to imperialist villain. Cynthia Grif-
fin Wolff's essay, '''Margaret Garner': A Cincinnati Story," shares Martin's 
approach as it also argues that specific historical moments generate a need 
for specific stories and myths that speak to the concerns and anxieties of that 
time period. In the article, Wolff discusses how the "unspeakable" story of 
Garner, an enslaved woman who commits infanticide to protect her child 
from a life in slavery, finds a voice in Toni Morrison's 1987 novel, Beloved. In 
an astute historical comparison, Wolff compares Morrison's full dramatiza-
tion of the story to Harriet Beecher Stowe's nineteenth-century depictions of 
slave existence in Uncle Tom's Cabill. Wolff uses this comparison to highlight 
the limitations of Stowe's antebellum novel, which maintains a silence about 
Garner's tale and therefore truncates the psychological complexity of slave 
existence. 
Michael T. Gilmore's "Hawthorne and tl,e Making of the Middle Class" 
also focuses on the antebellum novel-in this case, The Scarlet Letter-to ex-
amine the history of the formation of the middle class in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Gilmore advances the argument that questions of class are often mar-
ginalized in the study of nineteenth-century American literature and need as 
much critical attention as race and gender have received. Through a close 
reading of The Scarlet Letter, Gilmore demonstates how the book "participates 
in the project of shaping middle-class identity. [and] encodes tl,e deep 
structures of the middle class within its discursive patternings" (89). The 
strength of Gilmore's thesis lies not simply in his assertion of the importance 
of class analysis, but in his argument that the tensions and ambiguities in 
The Scarlet Lctter reflect the fluid and contested process of class formation. In 
other words, antebellum novels can be used to develop a more elaborate 
understanding of the internal conflicts within the development of nine-
teenth-century, middle-class identity. 
If a reader turns to Discoverillg Differel1ce to discover difference, the anthol-
ogy clearly does not disappoint. The heterogeneity of the essays reflect the 
editor's sincere desire to present a multiplicity of voices. Yet, after complet-
ing all of the ten essays, I was disappoined that each of the "voices" pre-
sented spoke in isol<1tion rather than in conversation with the others. If the 
objective of the book is "open dialogue" as Lohmann asserts, then the inter-
change needs to be explicit rather than implicit and left up to the reader to 
construct. A possible altern<1tivc to Discovering Differel1ce's approach of pre-
senting ten <Iutonomous topics would be to ask several scholars to examine 
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one text, such as The Scarlet Leftcr or D. W. Griffith's Intolerance, from multi-
ple perspectives. With this design, a reader could both" discover difference" 
in approach and witness dialogue as individual \vriters respond to the same 
work and to each others' analyses. The imperative of ending "intellectual 
turf battles" and breaking the silences that keep scholars from learning from 
each other is too important to ignore. Discovering Difference offers one possi-
bility for ending these destructive patterns. May it inspire many more. 
Yale University Suzanne E. Smith 
Real and Imagined Women: Gender, Culture and Postcolonialisl11 by Rajeswari 
Sunder Rajan. London and New York: Routledge, 1993. Pp. 153. $59.95, 
cloth; $16.95, paper. 
Even as the MLA job list expands to incorporate the concept of "cultural 
studies" as a new area of specialization, the struggle to determine its param-
eters and define the theoretical and methodological paradigms for a cultural 
critique continues among professionals in the field. Sunder Rajan's book is a 
welcome addition to this ongoing debate and provides a refreshing insight 
into the problems and pitfalls, as well as the political necessity at this histori-
cal moment, for the development of a concept such as "cultural studies." 
Sunder Rajan defines the term "culture" as "the product of the beliefs and 
conceptual models of society and as the destination where the trajectory of 
its desires takes shape, as well as the everyday practices, the contingent real-
ities, and the complex process by which these are structured" (10). By in-
cluding both "conceptual models" and "contingent realities" in this defini-
tion, Sunder Rajan attempts to deconstruct the culture/society division and 
provides a space for a critique that is engaged equally with discourse and 
materiality. The key concept that enables such a critique is that of "represen-
tation." By exploring the heterogeneity of cultural representations and their 
resulting openness to interpretation as \vell as contestation, Sunder Rajan is 
able to combine a critique of ideology with a form of political intervention 
that provides a much needed bridge between feminist theory and praxis. 
However, the brilliant execution of this cultural analysis in this book is 
somewhat marred by Sunder Rajan's failure to engage in any detailed theo-
retical discussion of the central concept of representation. The only place that 
has any discussion of the term itself is in the chapter on women in politics 
where the focus is exclusively on questions of political representation rather 
than the broader category of cultural representation. The theoretical confu-
sion thus generated complicates the question of agency in the analysis of 
representation of contestation in the final section of the book~how are these 
"self-representations" different from previous "representations"? Does their 
oppositional value lie in the interpretative act of the reader or in the female 
agency that is implicit in the very creation of these texts (as may be implied 
by the tenTI "sc~f-rcpresentation")? The failure of this book to pro\·ide clear 
answers to sllch questions leaves a seriolls gap in its theoretical framework. 
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This conceptual confusion, however, does not detract from the book's ex-
cellent analysis of the creation of female subjectivity and its reconstitution in 
the interests of feminist praxis. Through a very succinct and balanced sum-
mary of the current debates raging around the constitntion of the subject 
Sunder Rajan proves the unsuitability, for a feminist praxis, of adopting 
either the universal humanist version of subjectivity or its total rejection by 
certain schools of poststructnralist thought. Sunder Rajan's theoretical incli-
nations are clearly closer to the latter position, and consequently, she intro-
duces the concept of a "resisting subject" that allows for a measure of agency 
and thus fills the total vacuum left by the death of the subject while retain-
ing a sense of the politics of difference by manifesting itself as contingent, 
varied, and flexible in its modes of resistance. The concept of the resisting 
subject provides an effective theoretical alternative both to Spivak's complete 
denial of Ollf ability to access "real" women, as well as to Benita Parry's va-
lorization of "real" women's voices in the form of artists and singers of sa-
cred songs. In the context of feminisms' need to have a focal point for their 
programs of political intervention, I find this reconstitution of female subjec-
tivity in terms of the resisting subject to be one of the most enabling strate-
gies in the book. 
The practical implications of this theoretical construct are clearly spelt out 
through Sunder Rajan's detailed analysis of sati, rape, and wife-murder 
(dowry deaths). Each of these discussions begins with a useful summary of 
the existing debates on the topic and points towards exciting new avenues of 
exploration. In the case of sati, for example, Sunder Rajan refuses primacy to 
questions of intentionality and voluntariness that are at the center of current 
pro- as well as anti-sati arguments, and, instead, chooses to focus on the ma-
teriality of the body in pain as it burns. This shift in focus not only high-
lights the immediate experiential quality of the act that is the subject of nu-
merous theoretical debates but also allows Sunder Rajan to see, in the image 
of the burning woman straining to overcome her pain, a representation of a 
resisting subject who can no longer be viewed merely as a helpless victim. 
In her analysis of sati in terms of the politics of pain Sunder Rajan draws 
upon Elaine Scarry's theoretical inSights in The Body in Pain. This use of the 
work of a western scholar to examine a Third World phenomenon raises dif-
ficult questions about the possibly imperialist relationship between Western 
theory and Third World material. Concerns like those expressed by Chandra 
Mohanty of being ''tmder Western eyes" are, in fact, a major area of inquiry 
in Sunder Rajan's work. Her self-reflexive positioning of herself, at the be-
ginning of the book, as a postcolonial intellectnallocated in the Third World 
academy but with significant intellectual cormections with the West, fore-
grounds problems of appropriation, complicity, and compromise that cir-
cumscribe desires for Third World autonomy. Sunder Rajan's personal stand 
with respect to this First World/Third World opposition is clearly stated in 
the "Introduction" -while recognizing the validity of such concerns she 
forcefully states the necessity for a feminist praxis to maintain a global 
perspective and to forge cross-culhlral links without denying the reality of 
differences that do exist. Consequently, the outright rejection of any theoreti-
cal framework because of its Western connections is viewed as an rumeces-
sary limitation imposed upon feminism. Instead she proposes a strategic use 
. 
, 
j 
Criticism, Vol. XXXVII, No.1: Book Reviews 183 
of available resources that is constantly self-reflexive. Her use of Scarry's 
work illustrates this strategy by presenting a constant critique of the theoret-
ical model even as it is used as a basis for further analysis. While appropriat-
ing the concept of a politics of pain from Scarry, Sunder Rajan questions the 
validity of representing pain as inarticulate which denies its potential for re-
sistance. Furthermore, she recognizes that Scarry's book is caught in the clas-
sic orientalist bind of viewing the First World as the liberator and the Third 
World as victim. Her use of this work, even as she reveals its ethnocentric 
biases, makes her analysis itself an embodiment of the resisting subject. 
Sunder Rajan's desire for a global feminist perspective is also evident in 
her cross-cultural selection of texts to be analyzed. Her chapter on rape and 
narrative representation draws upon the works of Richardson, Forster, Ange-
lou, and Walker, along with both literary texts and fiims by Indian artists. 
The resisting subject here is seen in terms of narrative strategies that focus, 
in the texts by women, on the post-rape subjectivity of the woman. Such nar-
ratives present a direct contrast to the canonical First World textual represen-
tations of rape (in the characters of Clarissa and Adela Quested) that make 
rape the climax of the novel after which the woman's subjectivity is grad-
ually allowed to fade away. The women's texts deny the act of rape this de-
termining role in the constitution of women's subjectivity and thus challenge 
the fetishization of women as victims. 
Sunder Rajan, however, does not present these women's texts as sites of 
resistance that exist outside, and in opposition to, the cultural field that in-
cludes Richardson and Forster. Wary of privileging a discourse of resistance 
that totally appropriates the cultural text-a danger thaI she perceives in 
Lalitha and Tharu's Women Writing in India-Sunder Rajan is careful to point 
out caste and class issues that compromise the oppOSitional force of these 
texts. lnterestingly, though careful in the analysis of particular texts to avoid 
their appropriation for any single political agenda of her own, Sunder Rajan 
does not hesitate to use homogenizing categories such as "pre-colonial," "co-
lonial," and "postcolonial" in her theoretical analysis. The practical dictates 
of language do, to a certain extent, explain the necessity for some such 
usages, but in a self-conscious theoretical work the unquestioning use of a 
term like "postcolonial," and references to an undefined "pre-colonial" pe-
riod in Indian history, cause moments of concern that could easily be 
avoided by the addition of a few footnotes. 
A more serious cause of concern is found in the discussion of women and 
politics which makes the reader question the theoretical framework speCially 
constructed by the author for this work. In general terms I find this chapter 
to be one of the least inspiring sections of the book since it contains large 
sections where summaries of previous work done in the field are left to 
stand on their own with little or no additional analysis by the author. The 
exclusive emphasis on the figure of Indira Gandhi in the title of the chapter 
as well as in certain sections of the text that provide her biographical details 
is misleading since the chapter does not in the final instance provide any sig-
nificant analysis of her political career. The speCificity of Indira Gandhi is 
subsumed by the category of "elite women in politics." A consideration of 
the latter issue is in itself an important topic of discussion but the author 
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fails to successfully integrate the particular with the general in the organiza-
tion of this chapter. 
The high point of this chapter is the use of Jacqueline Rose's analysis of 
the place of women writers in feminist criticism as a means of highlighting 
certain anomalies in the situation of elite women in politics. The categories 
of the literary and the political are not collapsed, but a very fruitful parallel 
is drawn between the largely "unrepresentative" quality of both women 
writers and women leaders vis-it-vis the majority of women who inhabit a 
comparatively subaltern position in society. Insead, true representation is 
found in the concept of the "collective," and this leads Sunder Rajan to a dis-
cussion of the role of women in the local panchayats of the villages of India. 
Interestingly, the resisting subject in this chapter is presented not in terms of 
any text of cultural representation but rather as a case study of Viiner, a 
small village in Maharastra. There is no reference in the text of the chapter to 
the sources for this sociopolitical information (which are listed in the foot-
notes), and consequently, it appears to stand unrnediated through any form 
of textual representation-a form of presentation that is found only in this 
chapter focusing on politics. This significant departure from her usual strate-
gies of cultural analysis, combined with her assertion that questions concern-
ing political power are more "morally vexed" than those of literary creation, 
appears to resurrect a hierarchical relationship of mutual exclusion between 
the terms "real" and "imaginary" that is so carefully deconstructed through-
out the rest of the book. 
The theoretical and analytical confusion created by this chapter, however, 
does not seriously compromise the critical significance of the work as a 
whole. Chapters such as the one on dowry deaths and the final one on the 
representation of the "new woman" in India embody the greatest strengths 
of this book. Through a brilliant deconstructive strategy Sunder Rajan under-
mines the speech/ silence opposition by revealing how either of these can be 
used for both oppression and resistance. The political connotations of the si-
lenced subaltern are challenged by the use of authorial silence in works such 
as Anuradha Ramanan's "The Embrace" where the ambiguity thus gener-
ated is potentially subversive. Similarly, the privileged position of speech in 
terms of individual expression and subjectivity is significantly undermined 
by speech acts such as the dying declarations of burnt wives who acquit 
their husbands of all blame. Sunder Rajan then proposes "action" as an arena 
of resistance for the silenced gendered subaltern. However, as the analysis of 
the film Khoon Bhari Maang illustrates, the representation of "action" is also 
circumscribed by oppressive ideological manipulations. Action, therefore, is 
not presented as a "purer" form of resistance than speech. Rather, II action" 
acts like the third point on a triangle that places the speech/silence dichot-
omy under erasure and expands the scope for a consideration of reSisting 
subjectivi ties. 
The final chapter is primarily concerned with the opposition between tra-
dition and modernity that provides the framework for media representations 
of the "new woman" in India. These "imaginary" constructions of women's 
subjectivity soft-peddle the historical specificity and complexity of these op-
posing demands on women by presenting images of effortless reconciliation 
where the "modem" is seen as a Simple extension of the "traditional." As the 
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idea of women's liberation is embodied in a line of figures stretching from 
Draupadi to Laxmibai, the need for a contemporary feminist movement is 
made redundant. At the same time, the focus of state policies and journalis-
tic coverage on "women's issues" further limits any space for an autono-
mous feminist consciousness founded upon female agency. Such a siege of 
feminism requires a feminist project that provides conceptual alternatives to 
these "imaginary" constructions which represent women's autonomy within 
a viable social structure. Sunder Rajan locates such representations of "real" 
women in self-consciously feminist texts engaging with the complexity of a 
social reality that makes women both II conflicting subjects and sites of con-
flict," and presenting modes of resistance rooted in this reality. The "real" 
nature of these cultural representations, as opposed to the "imaginary" char-
acter of mass media representations, is seen as a function of their engage-
ment with the material reality of historical contingency and social complex-
ity rather than any claims of ideological neutrality. 
Real and Imagined Women may contain conceptual ambiguities that, at 
times, weaken its interpretative framework, but its overall project of pre-
senting a theoretical perspective on postcolonial feminism rooted in cultural 
analysis is deftly executed, which makes it an essential read for scholars en-
gaged in debates regarding postcolonialism and cultural studies. Sunder Ra-
jan has made a notable contribution to these fields not only through the bril-
liant insights provided by her readings of the individual texts, but also 
through her use of challenging new strategies of cross-cultural analysis that 
will prove to be indispensable for further work in the area of postcolonial 
feminism. Intellectally stimulating and politically empowering, this work of 
Indian feminism is an important bridge between feminist scholars working 
in the "First" and the "Third" world. 
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